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Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP—Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones

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ABSTRACT *This article aims at analyzing Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East during the 2000s. It argues that intensification of Turkey's economic relations with the region is due to the changes in the Turkish economy and the coming to power of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). It looks at the relationship between the AKP and the business communities and foreign trade in general and elaborates on the trade figures and relations with individual countries. It looks at the economic cooperation projects and the vision presented by the Turkish policy-makers. The article also looks at the drawbacks and possible future developments in the economic relations.*

After a decade of conflict and tension with the Middle East during the 1990s, Turkey's relations with the region have begun to change since the end of the decade. The warming of political relations has also been coupled with increasing economic relations. It is important to underline that economic relations with the region initially developed under the shadow of political developments and will at the political level. This is not surprising since, rather than economics, politics drives regional developments in general. As Turkey's political relations with the Middle East began to normalize at the end of the 1990s, improvement in economic relations followed shortly thereafter. This article argues that apart from its dependence on political developments, the reasons for intensification of economic relations are twofold: The first reason is related to changes in the Turkish economy and the second reason relates to the coming to power of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*). The first reason emphasizes Turkey's emerging need to trade more due to its economic growth and the transformation of its economy including its integration in global markets. The Middle East took on

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significance to Turkey in this context. The second reason relates to the ways in which the Turkish state under the AKP has begun to act in accordance with its role as a “trading state”¹ and highlights the influence business communities have on Turkish foreign policy and Middle East relations.

Turkish Economic Growth and Trade

The Turkish economy embarked on an economic liberalization program on January 24, 1980, and since then has transformed its economy from a state-led developmentalist model to an export-led growth strategy. Under the Premiership of Turgut Özal, the economy has come to be guided by a liberal approach, and despite some critical voices regarding the reform strategy, there was no doubt that by the end of the 1990s, Turkey had come a long way toward integrating with the world economy through trade and investment. In addition to this, these liberalization packages led to the emergence of small-scale family businesses in Anatolia that were dynamic, well adapted for flexible production patterns, and actively competing in international markets. Known as the Anatolian Tigers, they formed the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD, *Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*) in 1990. Unlike the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD, *Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*), founded in 1971, which represents large firms and holdings mostly based in the Marmara region, is politically and economically Western-oriented and based on European organizational models, MÜSİAD brings together small- to medium-sized businesses from cities around Anatolia and has adopted a primarily Eastern-looking strategy, which is where Middle Eastern countries have emerged as an important market. MÜSİAD brought Islamic values and conduct into the business community and has become especially important first during the Welfare Party government in the mid-1990s and later under the AKP in the 2000s.

Despite integration with global markets and the growth of the Anatolian bourgeoisie during the 1990s, the Turkish economy has witnessed a series of crises. The 2001 economic crisis has been especially important. The economic growth rate in 2001 was -9.4 percent, compared with the 6.3 percent in 2000; the manufacturing industry shrank by 9 percent and the number of businesses closed during the first five months of 2001 reached $15,317$.² As a result, that year the country adopted a stabilization program that prioritized a market economy and minimum intervention by the state, and whose positive results would be seen in the coming years. What is also significant about the crisis for this paper is how it led to the transformation of industrial and financial capital in Turkey from the dominant capital accumulation strategy resting on “rentier profits extracted from the state apparatus” to a “dynamic accumulation” approach based on internationalization and competition on a world scale.³ This first of all led to the bankruptcy of companies that were using the first strategy and were dependent on state funds. Second, companies that managed to shift to the dynamic accumulation strategies had turned to new regions and new sectors. Mustafa Kutlay of Koç University and of USAK, notes that this process has further

encouraged economic actors that had previously been excluded from the benefits of state mechanisms (Anatolian Tigers) to “go and invest abroad.” This became a period in which “the Turkish business elite have begun to explore economic and financial opportunities in neighboring countries, and have backed the state in its efforts to stabilize the region for the sake of their interests, *inter alia*.”⁴ The AKP came to power at a time when the 2001 stabilization program was in effect and the demand for more integration with global markets and neighboring countries was very high.

The AKP, the Turkish Economy and the Business Community

Since it came to power in 2002, the AKP has shown that it is a party of business with its emphasis on macro-economic stability, economic growth and expansion of private investment. In line with the discussion above, a more active policy, including more trade and investment in Turkey’s surrounding regions, was encouraged. In his 2001 book *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth) Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu writes, “in relations with our neighbors, we need to increase the mobilization of individuals. What is needed is a policy that will ensure the flow of values and relations of the surrounding regions to Turkey.”⁵ The Middle East, with its oil wealth, stands out as an important region by this thinking; increased business among the region’s oil-rich economies would help the growth of Turkey’s own economy. The importance of business in foreign policy was made clear by Davutoğlu in a 2004 interview, during which he outlined how the business community became one of the driving forces of Turkish foreign policy.⁶ Professor Kemal Kirişçi from Bosphorus University, notes that this was a period in which Turkey was becoming a “trading state,” wherein “foreign policy becomes increasingly shaped by economic considerations” and foreign trade constitutes an important part of the GNP.⁷

Among those in the business community the relationship between MÜSİAD members and the AKP was the strongest; indeed Şebnem Gümüüşçü and Deniz Sert call the AKP “the party of the rising devout bourgeoisie.”⁸ MÜSİAD has played an active role in the party since its establishment, as many MÜSİAD members have “joined the AKP to complete the organization of the local offices of the party in Anatolian cities.”⁹ With reference to business networks in the USA, for example, C. Wright Mills argues that “business influence over government came not through distant lobbying but through a shared world view, informal personal networks and overlapping roles.”¹⁰ MÜSİAD’s influence over the AKP government and its foreign policy follows the same pattern, as this influence stems mainly from a shared worldview and overlapping informal personal networks. As MÜSİAD supports the AKP, so will the policies of the AKP need to support MÜSİAD in order to continue to generate support.

Most of the AKP’s state visits began to be organized by the business community, and many businessmen accompanied state leaders at their official visits. Until 2005, this function was mainly presided over by Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK, *Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu*), which had been formed by the state in the mid-1980s and charged with coordinating the business community’s foreign economic relations

by providing information, organizing official visits and, through bilateral cooperation councils, facilitating foreign economic relations. The 2005 creation of Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON, *Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu*), a private, voluntary umbrella organization comprised mostly of small- and medium-sized businesses, with a membership that reached 33,260 entrepreneurs by 2011, has been important in this context.¹¹ TUSKON, although not formed by the state, works closely with state institutions, sharing many functions with DEİK regarding Turkey's foreign business relations. What is important is that TUSKON's statements and strategy are in full conformity with those of the AKP, and the confederation is characterized as "always supporting and never challenging the government's position."¹² Some writers point out that it has been TUSKON's pro-government stance that has given it such a privileged position in its relations with the government.¹³ TUSKON organizes the annual Turkey–Middle East Trade Bridge, a forum bringing together businessmen from around the region in Istanbul. It was not only MÜSİAD that supported the AKP government and formed its backbone, now through TUSKON the government also had the organization through which to support its foreign economic activities.

The AKP and Middle Eastern Markets

The performance of the Turkish economy has been impressive since the 2001 stabilization program. The economic policy of the AKP government, which rests on reaping the fruits of the stabilization program, has successfully generated economic growth, which reached 7.8 percent in 2010. Such growth in the economy resulted in an increasing hunger for new markets. Turkey's total foreign trade volume increased from \$72 billion in 2001 to \$333 billion in 2008 (see Table 1), and it is important to note that in 2009, 59.8 percent of exports came from small- and medium-sized businesses.¹⁴ In 2009, Turkey produced half of the entire output of the Middle East and North Africa combined, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Israel.¹⁵ By 2010, Turkey had become the 16th largest economy in the world and a member of the G-20, with a GDP of approximately \$736 billion in 2010.¹⁶

Turkey's increasing share within the Middle East can be seen by looking at its foreign trade structure. In 2003, Turkey's trade figures showed Europe's share as 53.6 percent and that of the Middle East as 8.49 percent. These figures for 2007 were 46.5 percent for Europe and 10 percent for the Middle East. In 2010, although the figures are still not final, European trade has decreased to 41.6 percent, while Middle Eastern trade has increased to 17.16 percent.¹⁷

Why the Middle East has emerged as the main new route for trade and business becomes an important question. The most significant reason lies in the new foreign policy vision put forward by Davutoğlu. In facilitating Turkey's economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries, the "zero problems with neighbors" policy stands out. Davutoğlu argues that one of the key principles accounting for Turkey's position in the Middle East is economic interdependence. Moreover, "order in the Middle East cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of isolated economies."¹⁸ By establishing

Table 1. Turkey's Trade with the Middle East (Billion Dollars)

Year	Import	Export	Volume of trade (Middle East)	Total volume of trade
1996	3.31	2.59	5.90	66.85
1997	2.77	2.82	5.59	74.81
1998	2.08	2.68	4.76	72.89
1999	2.12	2.56	4.68	67.25
2000	3.37	2.57	5.94	82.27
2001	3.01	3.26	6.27	72.73
2002	3.18	3.43	6.61	87.61
2003	4.45	5.46	9.91	116.59
2004	5.58	7.92	13.50	160.70
2005	7.96	10.18	18.14	190.25
2006	10.56	11.31	21.87	225.11
2007	12.64	15.08	27.72	277.33
2008	17.62	25.43	43.05	333.99
2009	9.59	19.19	28.78	243.07
2010 ^a	16.09	23.31	39.40	299.52

Source: Adapted from Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK, *Turkish Statistical Institute*). www.tuik.gov.tr

^a2010 figures are not final.

interdependencies in the region, Davutoğlu's expectation is not only the creation of a venue for Turkey's exports and business activities but also the achievement of regional peace. Intense economic and human interactions are both key components of such an effort. Increasing trade figures, growing investments and the free movement of people by lifting visa requirements have been important tools to this end. In contrast to the European model of interdependencies, which developed as a result of cooperation in key economic areas—steel and coal—that later had a spill-over effect onto other segments and ultimately led to political interdependencies and integration, Turkey's trade with the region has developed under the shadow of political developments, and cooperation at the political level was then reflected at the economic level. This model of economic cooperation carries the risk of becoming weakened in the case of political change on either side and needs institutionalization to make its economic activities immune to possible turmoil at the political level. The High-Level Strategic Councils and the Levant Project, discussed below, become important examples of the process of institutionalization within this framework.

To build on the concept of interdependency, in reviewing the speeches and writings of Davutoğlu, one point he stresses is what he calls the artificiality of Turkey's borders with its neighbors, which have not been drawn along real geographical boundaries. Drawn by Western powers as the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, these borders have severed the geographical and economic continuity of the

hinterland, a situation that must be remedied by reintegration with these neighboring zones.¹⁹ The lifting of visa requirements for many countries, as will be argued below, aims to overcome what is considered to be the artificial separation of people and places that were once a part of a single hinterland, and by increasing interdependency, to reunify this hinterland.

Apart from reasons relating to Davutoğlu's "new foreign policy vision," some other reasons complement the "vision" of increasing economic relations with the Middle East. One obvious reason is the region's proximity and the attractiveness of its oil-rich economy. Second, the Customs Union agreement signed in 1996 has had disappointing results for the development of trade with EU countries, as this agreement was not followed up with a Free Trade Agreement with the EU.²⁰ As accession negotiations have also gotten stuck, Turkey has had to turn to alternative partners. In other words, the state of relations with the EU has led Turkey to search for new markets, and the Middle East has emerged as an alternative. The shift away from the Western markets conforms to the general world economic trend, as the global economic activity shifts eastward, especially since the 2008 economic crisis hit the Western economies.²¹ Third, the Middle East becomes an important market and economic partner, as most MÜSIAD and TUSKON members feel ideologically close to the Muslim nations of the Middle East. Related to this argument, on both the Turkish and Arab sides the mutually negative stereotypes that have been dominant for years have gradually subsided, and this has played a role in bringing the two communities closer. Turkey's increasing soft power has been seen in the popularity of Turkish soap operas and the attractiveness of Turkish goods on the Arab market.²² As Turkey's and Prime Minister Erdoğan's popularity has increased on the Arab street, Turkish goods and investments have also become more popular. Among the Turkish business community, there is also the perception that most of the economies of the Middle East are either backward or have been closed to liberal market forces for years. Now, these markets are seen as attractive, being perceived as undiscovered and ripe for an infusion of Turkish goods.²³

Looking at the trade figures above, it is clear that there has been an increase in the volume of trade with the region, especially from 2007 onwards, the AKP's second term in office. There had been a decrease in 2009 parallel to the world economic crisis, but numbers increased again in 2010. Many developments have facilitated the emerging Turkish–Middle Eastern interdependency, both at the economic and human levels. The lifting of visa requirements with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Libya has brought increasing trade figures as well as tourists. The number of tourists in Turkey from the Middle East reached 1.9 million in 2010. The number of Iranian tourists who travel to Turkey without a visa requirement has been most impressive: 1,885,097 Iranian tourists came to Turkey in 2010.²⁴ These numbers have been increasing for every Middle Eastern country except Israel. The number of Israeli tourists, meanwhile, has declined dramatically, from around 550,000 in 2008 to around 100,000 in 2010.²⁵ However, as will be discussed below, the decrease in tourism was not similarly reflected in trade figures.

To further facilitate trade and interaction, an investment of \$70 million was made toward the rehabilitation of a railway line linking Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was reopened in February 2010. Turkish construction firms have invested about \$35.5 billion in the Middle East over the last decade. State Minister Responsible for Foreign Trade, Zafer Çağlayan, declared his determination to pursue “zero problems, limitless trade.”²⁶ To that end, state visits continued to include large numbers of businessmen. Minister Çağlayan announced that \$247 million worth of business was settled during state visits to Kuwait and Qatar at the beginning of 2011.²⁷ This is just one example of the connection between state visits and growing trade and business interactions.

Relations with Syria have especially been important. In a 2007 article, Davutoğlu writes that the economic interdependence and sound diplomatic relations between Syria and Turkey “stand as a model of progress for the rest of the region.”²⁸ While Turkey views Syria as a gateway for Turkish goods to the Gulf, Syria views Turkey as a gateway to the EU. The increasing trade between the two countries has become visible especially after the Free Trade Agreement that has been operational since 2007 (see Table 2). However, economic activity has not been confined to trade; an increasing number of firms have begun to invest in the Syrian market. The largest Turkish investments of its sector for the entire Middle East was also made in Syria when Turkish firm Güriş invested 280 million Euros in the construction of a cement factory in Rakka.²⁹ Parallel to the increasing trade, an abundance of Turkish goods can now be found in Syrian markets. Although presented as a success story, economic relations with Syria carry some drawbacks that may be predictive for relations with other countries. Since 2007, the influx of Turkish goods and investments resulting from the Free Trade Agreement have led many Syrian businessmen and manufacturing families, especially in Aleppo, to complain that they are being put out of business because they cannot compete with superior Turkish imports.³⁰ Such complaints have been voiced at various levels in the Syrian polity without much success, as political will to further the cooperation has been very strong at the highest levels.³¹ In addition, the fact that Syria remains very much the junior partner of these economic relations, and that trade figures are in Turkey’s favor, is noteworthy. Syrian Minister of

Table 2. Turkey’s Trade Volume with Selected Middle East Countries (Million Dollars)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Egypt	516	513	444	535	728	954	1.101	1.582	2.369	3.259	3.187
Iran	1.051	1.200	1.254	2.394	2.775	4.382	6.693	8.056	10.229	5.430	10.687
Iraq	–	–	–	941	2.288	3.208	2.965	3.490	5.238	6.078	7.398
Israel	1.155	1.334	1.405	1.542	2.029	2.271	2.311	2.739	3.383	2.598	3.443
Lebanon	151	209	229	219	381	340	367	509	843	794	848
Syria	729	744	773	824	752	823	795	1.174	1.751	1.753	2.511

Source: Directorate of Foreign Trade.

Economy and Trade Lamia Asi said, “although trade with Turkey is in favor of Turkey, we are not disturbed by this. Our trade to Turkey is also increasing. We want to make up the difference in trade with the benefits of investments from Turkey.”³² Despite this statement, during bilateral meetings, the issue is regularly raised by the Syrian side.³³ Complaints by Syrian businessmen that Turkish companies, with the exception of a few, are more concerned with short-term benefits than with long-term investments, have also been raised. One businessman complained that Syria was the recipient of “small capital” while they wanted TÜSİAD-kind of business, ready to commit and play the game by global standards.³⁴

Lenore Martin, in 2004, wrote that “Turkey has a strong interest in improving its economic relations with Iraq. [...] Iraq is an easy destination for Turkish products.”³⁵ As can be seen from the figures above, Martin’s analysis proved correct as trade figures with Iraq have increased rapidly over the last couple of years. Since the end of the 2003 war, trade relations have been on the increase. More important has been the level of investment specifically in Northern Iraq. As of September 2009, 500 Turkish companies had invested in Northern Iraq, and Turkey was among its top 10 foreign investors.³⁶ Khalid Salih, Chief Advisor of the Prime Minister of the Regional Administration, expressed gratitude, saying that it was thanks to Turkey that they had managed to overcome the difficult days of the 1990s. “Today my region is in a process of rapid development” he said, adding “we would like to see Turkey as an investor in our region. We are ready to give any support needed.”³⁷ By 2010, trade with Northern Iraq had reached \$5.2 billion, and during a state visit to Erbil, Minister Çağlayan announced the two countries’ intention to increase that figure to \$20 billion in four years.³⁸ In addition to trade and investment, Turkey also supplies the region’s electricity.

Trade figures have also been significantly increasing with Iran, reaching 10 billion dollars in 2010, with both sides committed to an ambitious 30 billion dollar target within two more years. Since Iran’s trade with its main partner, the UAE, has been severed as a result of sanctions, there is information that Iran has turned to Turkey.³⁹ The Turkish side has been arguing that the sanctions do not have a great impact on trade with Iran because the regime of UN sanctions “singles out industries in which Turkish companies do not have much commerce going on anyway.”⁴⁰ Iran’s decision to switch its major trading routes away from the Gulf toward Turkey will contribute further to trade between the two countries,⁴¹ which up to now has primarily been dominated by Iranian oil and natural gas imports to Turkey.

The establishments of various “High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils” with Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have been instrumental to further the integration. Within the context of this mechanism, the success of which indicates the depth of bilateral relations, at least once every year the Turkish Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of each participating state jointly host a ministerial meeting. The ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Energy, Trade, Public Works, Defense, Interior Affairs and Transportation meet at least twice every year to build a common action plan, which is subsequently discussed in detail at Ministerial Council meetings, then executed under the joint leadership of the two Prime Ministers.

In December 2010, a new project called the “East Mediterranean Four: Levant Business Forum,” was initiated with the signatures of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The project aims to increase welfare and economic stability in the region, and includes 75 agreements in 14 different areas enabling free movement of goods and people, as well as cooperation in the education and cultural fields. Through this project, Turkey is expected to double its trade with these countries. The current figure indicates that the partnership agreement works in favor of Turkey. According to the IMF, the total value of the GDP of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan is over one trillion dollars. Turkey’s share of this is 82 percent. Minister Çağlayan said the project would “create a sphere of welfare at the heart of the Middle East.”⁴² Before the agreement was announced, Davutoğlu, in accordance with the aforementioned discussion on interdependency and peace through trade, said: “We will declare . . . that this economic zone is in effect. We hope that this is good news not only for these four countries but also for the entire region.”⁴³ Describing this project as a first step in a 10–15-year process, Head of the Turkish-Middle East Business Council, Mehmet Habbab, said that with time, other countries are expected to join.⁴⁴ Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, President of The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*) and DEİK, argues that the Middle East, unlike other regions, has been unable to establish regional economic trade areas and integration, and sees this project as a first step to regional economic integration.⁴⁵ A few days after the Levant Business Forum was signed, 70 large firms from these countries joined TUSKON’s “Turkey-Middle East Trade Bridge—3” meeting. Increased sales were expected following the meeting, thanks to the agreement. One participant from Jordan declared at the meeting that he had “already made one deal” and added that Turkey was “not only a Muslim country and a trusted partner in business but also offers goods of high quality.”⁴⁶ Head of TUSKON Rızanur Meral said Turkey’s total trade volume with these countries constituted only 2.5 percent of total Turkish trade and added, “Although this seems small, we plan to reach \$10 billion in the coming years.” Considering that Turkey’s trade volume with these countries was around four billion dollars in 2010, this would be a great achievement. Noting that Turkey is the fifth largest market in its trade with Iraq, he said the same increase was expected with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and added that the “home textiles, furniture, food and construction sectors are making inroads in these countries.”⁴⁷

It is interesting to observe that despite the level of tension between Turkey and Israel during the second half of the 2000s, especially after Davos in 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31, 2010, trade figures have not deteriorated along with diplomatic relations. Although there was a decline in the number of tourists in 2010, as mentioned above, the volume of trade has not decreased. Monthly trade figures since the Mavi Marmara incident (Table 3) reveal no radical change. Although accounting for a smaller proportion of Turkey’s overall trade, compared with 2009 figures, 2010 figures show a month-by-month increase in trade. This may be due to the rather longer period of economic relations; Turkey and Israel signed a Free Trade Agreement in 1996, and during the subsequent decade of

Table 3. Turkey's Economic Relations with Israel (Million Dollars)

2010	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Exports	168	153	159	170	169	151	213	156	234
Imports	130	130	174	120	87	83	85	127	133
2009									
Exports	112	103	132	146	121	113	147	123	168
Imports	103	75	85	70	103	73	68	78	117

Source: Directorate of Foreign Trade.

relations' networks strong enough to withstand political turmoil were established. Time will tell if the more recent partnerships being explored in this paper will progress similarly.

The Arab Spring

Although it is still early to be discussing the impact of the "Arab Spring," initial figures give us some idea as to how trade and investment with the region will be affected. Although economic relations with Tunisia and Egypt seem to have been recovering, the situation with Libya is severe and relations with Syria are delicate. President of the Turkish Exporters Assembly, Mehmet Büyükekeşi, said the developments in the Middle East and North Africa were very important for Turkey "because trade with this region constitute[s] 27 percent of Turkey's exports, 11 percent of its imports and 17 percent of Turkey's overall trade." According to Büyükekeşi, despite these developments, there has been no radical change because losses in some countries are being made up by gains in others. He cited exports from the first two months of 2011, which showed decreases of 21 percent with Egypt, 38 percent with Tunisia and 6 percent with Libya, but increases of 61 percent with Iran, 40 percent with Iraq, 33 percent with Saudi Arabia and 144 percent with the UAE.⁴⁸

Kemal Şahin, Head of Şahinler Holding, declared that his organization had not been affected much by the "Arab Spring." Operator of two textile factories in Egypt and Jordan, Şahin stated that in Egypt, even at the height of the revolutionary events, their factory was closed for only one day, and have been functioning at 80 percent capacity. As customs offices and banks have been closed, however, there has been a decline in the exports, but Şahin claims these losses are temporary and will be made up for by increasing tourism from the region. He also claims that as a result of these developments, Middle Eastern capitalists will be shifting their investments to more stable Turkey, making it "a castle of construction and investment in other service sectors."⁴⁹ Despite this optimism, losses in Libya have been significant. The level of exports has declined from \$146.445 million in January 2011 to a mere \$3.638 million in April, recovering slightly to \$41.462 million in May.⁵⁰ Most notable damage has been in investments, especially in the construction sector.

Ersin Takla, Head of the Turkish–Libya Business Council, reported that the level of investment projects in Libya, had reached \$60 billion before the events broke out, and due to events, damage reached \$40 billion.⁵¹ For example, Mesa Mesken’s \$200 million worth of university building sites have been totally demolished, Arsel Construction’s six building sites were plundered, and the building site of Özaltın Holding, which had undertaken \$1 billion worth of infrastructure projects, was burned to the ground.⁵² The Head of MÜSİAD, Ömer Cihad Vardan, calculating the damage to construction work in the billions of dollars, said the affected businessmen had still not received payment for jobs already completed.⁵³ The developments in Syria also carry the risk of impacting trade and investment in the region. As described above, Turkish–Syrian economic relations, despite problems, have been deepening due to the will at the political level. In the event the current upheavals affect political relations, problems in the economic relationship may also surface. Whether the currently existing networks will be enough to sustain the relationship is yet to be seen.

Conclusion

Turkey’s economic relations with the Middle East have increased significantly since 2001. In this paper it has been argued that this has mainly been due to the country’s economic performance, and to the coming to power of the AKP, with its vision of integration with neighboring zones and its links with the business community. Turkey, with its economic growth figure of 7.8 percent in 2010, has the power to impact the region’s other economies, though current trade figures, which favor Turkey, are a source of potential criticism by regional partners.

The article also elaborated the relationship between Turkish business associations and the AKP, and argued that, through the creation of TUSKON, the government has helped to introduce a new actor to foreign economic relations, an act of support that is reciprocated through TUSKON’s support of government activities. In an interview, the President of TUSKON, Rızanur Meral, declared the organization’s support for the “stability moves” of the last eight years (the AKP years), and professed that they were “hoping for a result that will continue the political stability” after the June 2011 elections.⁵⁴ While Meral was calling for stability and by extension the continuation of the AKP government, Prime Minister Erdoğan was giving speeches praising TUSKON and differentiating it from other business associations. In a speech at TUSKON’s Expanded Presidents’ Meeting, Erdoğan said, “You did not achieve what you have through unlawful credits, incentives, corruption and nepotism, you achieved them on your own, meaning with *helal* (religiously just) money.” After describing his pride in the fact that TUSKON members were operating enterprises in almost every country around the world, he reiterated that TUSKON members emerged “against a period when all support, credit and nepotism was concentrated in certain regions and sectors and provided to only some people,” and how they represented the power, capital and accumulation of Anatolia and Thrace.⁵⁵ The aforementioned changes in capital accumulation strategies as a result of the 2001 economic

crisis run parallel with Erdoğan's disinclination toward the state-dependent bourgeoisie of the earlier decades, favoring instead his allies in the business community among the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, to whom he commits further development and enrichment opportunities through further facilitation of foreign trade. At a time when the AKP's relations with TÜSİAD have been deteriorating, such vigorous criticism of one and praise of the other carries significant meaning.

TUSKON's influence is only expected to increase. Rızanur Meral has taken on the task of "creating" 40,000 new exporters in the coming years to meet the set 500 billion dollars export target by 2023. The Middle East is emerging as an important market for Turkey's exports and, currently, the number of exporters and the volume of trade in the region are meant to increase. More economic activity—both trade and investment—with the Middle East is expected in the coming years, though the path may not continue so smoothly. The first potential roadblock may be the primacy of political issues in driving economic ones; there is a need for the business relations to take root and develop their own dynamism such that they may become more institutionalized. Yet, a possible civil war in Syria and the turmoil in Libya would make this difficult. Dissatisfaction with the asymmetrical trade agreements may also elicit resistance to or suspicion of Turkey's policies and interests in the region. Yet, as the Turkish economy continues to grow, its hunger for new market opportunities will most assuredly grow in parallel.

Notes

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Engagement with Africa: Making Sense of Turkey's Approach in the Context of Growing East-West Rivalry

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Engagement with Africa: Making Sense of Turkey's Approach in the Context of Growing East-West Rivalry

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ABSTRACT

Africa's booming growth dynamics have drawn a renewed interest of its traditional Western trade partners, who felt their preferential relations threatened by the growing Chinese competition for access to the abundant strategic resources. The Chinese approach of combining trade in minerals with investments in large infrastructure projects to access the needed resources has transformed the traditional structure of the geopolitical rivalry on the continent. With the objectives of the geostrategic game shifting from territorial domination to political hegemony, oil and profits, the payoffs to different protagonists have become more complementary than mutually exclusive. As a result, new foreign actors seeking to use their own specific approaches to take advantage of the growing African trade and investment opportunities have emerged. In this article, we analyse the main patterns of global actors' engagement with Africa, as well as shed some light on the way how Turkey has gotten involved in the continent. We hope to make sense of Turkey's growing diplomatic and trade relationships with Africa in the context of the increasing competition for influence between Africa's traditional Western partners and the emerging Asian global players. One of our goals is to ascertain whether Turkey's engagement with Africa is something unique or bears resemblance to other actors' engagement.

Keywords: Francafrique, Africom, Geostrategic Rivalry, China, Turkey's Africa Policy.

Afrika'yla İlgilenmek: Doğu-Batı Rekabeti bağlamında Türkiye'nin Afrika Yaklaşımını Anlamlandırmak

ÖZET

Afrika'nın gelişmekte olan ticaret dinamikleri, kendilerini Çin'in kıta üzerindeki stratejik kaynaklarına erişimi konusundaki rekabeti karşısında tehdit altında hisseden Batılı müttefiklerin ilgisini çekmektedir. Çin'in ihtiyacı olan kaynaklara erişimi bağlamında benimsediği doğal kaynaklar üzerindeki ticaret ile büyük altyapı projelerini birleştirme yönündeki yaklaşımı kıta üzerindeki geleneksel jeopolitik rekabetin yapısını değiştirmiştir. Jeostratejik oyunun amacının karasal hakimiyet kurmaktan çıkıp siyasi hegemonya tesis etme odaklı olmaya başlamasıyla, petrol, kar ve farklı aktörlerin kazançları birbirlerini dışlayıcı olmak yerine birbirlerini tamamlayıcı olmaya başlamıştır. Bunun sonucunda, Afrika'nın gelişmekte olan ticaret ve yatırım fırsatlarından istifade etmek amacıyla bölgeye yönelik kendi yaklaşımlarını oluşturan yeni dış politika aktörleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu makalede küresel aktörlerin bölgeye yönelik politikalarının ana hatlarını ve Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya nasıl müdahil olmaya başladığını analiz ediyoruz. Umudumuz, Türkiye'nin Afrika'yla olan ticari ve diplomatik ilişkilerini, kıta üzerinde rekabet halinde olan geleneksel Batılı müttefikler ile yükselmekte olan Asyalı küresel oyuncular arasındaki mücadele bağlamında anlamlandırmaktır. Amaçlarımızdan bir diğeri Türkiye'nin Afrika açılımının kendine özgü mü olduğunu ya da diğer aktörlerin açılımlarına benzeyip bezemediğini incelemektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Francafrique, Africom, Jeostratejik Rekabet, Çin, Türkiye'nin Afrika Politikası.

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Introduction

After a long period of relative neglect, Turkey has recently intensified its diplomatic and trade relationships with Africa beyond its traditional neighborhood of North African countries that were once under Ottoman rule. This intensification was formally launched in 2005 and led to the opening of more than 17 new embassies in various Sub-Saharan African countries between 2009 and 2012, with plans to open even more in the future. In order to strengthen the legitimacy of its new relations with Africa, Turkey has also emerged as a new donor, providing development assistance and humanitarian relief to various African nations.¹ Like traditional OECD donors, Turkey is leveraging aid to African countries as a foreign policy instrument aimed at sending political signals both at home and to the outside world. Turkey has thus become a global player who can use politics and ideology at the services of its economic relations.

This new Turkish interest in, and opening up to Africa, came at a time when many African economies had started to enjoy relatively robust growth rates as a result of a booming trade with China. This boom in Sino-African trade, essentially buoyed by abundant African oil and minerals, has given China a growing influence in Africa, which has drawn considerable attention of both mainstream media and academic research. It has also prompted the traditional Western power brokers, mainly France and the United States, to readjust their African policies in order to face what they perceive as a threatening Chinese competition for access to African strategic resources. Being a longstanding ally of the West through its NATO membership, Turkey might be drawn to side with its Western allies in the ongoing confrontation against China and be induced to support the growing militarization of the continent for the control of its resources. The pressing questions for Turkey as a global swing state are therefore: Which position will Turkey ultimately take in the face of growing rivalry between China and the West on the African resource market and what are the potential implications of alternative choices for Turkey's own engagement in Africa?

With its growing influence in international arenas, Turkey's choices in its engagement with Africa are poised to have a significant impact on global outcomes.

Alongside the new alluring business interests, there is also a race between the world's leading powers for geostrategic positioning. At stake are the abundant African natural resources, which are indispensable for Chinese economic growth and essential for Western defense industry and energy security.² As if it were a replication of the so-called

1 Saban Kardas, *Turkey's Development Assistance Policy: How to make sense of the new guy on the block*, German Marshall Fund, Policy Brief, 4 February 2013.

2 Oil from Angola and other West African countries is very important for the United States, since the total imports of oil from Africa have now overtaken the oil supply from Saudi Arabia. With security concerns in the post September 11, 2001 context, oil from the Gulf of Guinea represents a safer and more easily accessible source of energy supply compared to imports from unstable Middle East. According to data from Energy Information Administration (the US' official source of energy statistics), the United States imported nearly 21 percent of its petroleum from Africa, which is more than the combined imports from the Persian Gulf countries.

“New Great Game” on the African scene, this geostrategic rivalry denotes the competition for influence, power, hegemony and profits involving various state and non-state actors pursuing individual as well as collective interests. However, unlike the traditional structure of the geopolitical game, where the competition emphasizes the relationships between hegemonic power, politics and domination over identified geographical areas in a kind of zero-sum game, oil contracts, mining concessions, and lucrative trade deals are the dominant features the new East-West competition for African resources.

On this new scene of geopolitical jostling, it is interesting to note that whereas Western protagonists have continued to rely on their intense intelligence networks and military accords with targeted African states, China has changed the playing field and the structure of the game by flocking an army of traders and infrastructure construction workers, who have contributed to transforming the economic dynamics of the continent after decades of unbridled Western exploitation. The resulting new economic growth dynamics have transformed the rules of the geopolitical game, rendering the payoffs to the different players complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Despite this change in the game structure, the flourishing literature of foreign involvement on the African resource market has so far continued to focus primarily on the Chinese presence and its conflicting interest with respect to the United States and European traditional partners of African states, paying little attention to the role that lesser prominent powers can play in this modified structure of geostrategic rivalry. Although some, such as Klare and Volman, have recognized the multiplicity of players in this competition for influence, the ability of regional powers such as Turkey to affect the balance of power in this face-off has not received the importance it deserves in that debate.³ Besides, the number of academic studies that primarily deal with the policies of the middle powers like Turkey on the African continent has remained extremely limited.⁴

Against this backdrop of shifting geopolitical structure, this paper analyses the intensification Turkish diplomatic and economic relations with African countries, and examines its weight in balancing the powers in this rivalry. Because of its rising status on the international scene as an emerging regional power, Turkey has been characterized, together with India, Indonesia and Brazil, as a “global swing state” in regard to its ability to affect the outcome of the global game of influence between China and the West.⁵ Given its record of distinctive and mixed views about prevailing international order, this means (by analogy to US domestic politics) that Turkey’s choices in its relations with Africa can tip the balance of power either way and have significant implications for the global order.⁶

3 Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, “America, China and the Scramble for Africa’s Oil”, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 108, 2006, p.297-309.

4 Gökhan Bacik, and Isa Afacan, “Turkey Discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The Critical Role of Agents in the Construction of Turkish-Foreign Policy Discourse”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2013, p.483-502.

5 Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman, “International Order and Global Swing States”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No.1, 2013, p.93-109, 101-2.

6 Daniel Kliman and Richard Fontaine, *Turkey: A Global Swing State*, German Marshall Fund, Policy Brief, 13 April 2012.

The alternative positions that Turkey can take in this setting have totally different implications for African countries as well and have the potency to affect the relationship between Africa and the world. In order to understand the dynamics of the rivalry and the force that may swing Turkey's choices, we first present the growing militarization of the continent as a situational background of the geostrategic rivalry between incumbent Western power brokers France and US and then the major new entrant, China. We then examine the Turkish diplomatic and trade relations with Africa in the light of this rivalry and examine how it may react to the changing dynamics. The final section concludes with implications of either choice for both Turkey and Africa.

Geo-strategy of Natural Resources in Post-colonial Africa

The Various Approaches to Accessing African Resources

The geopolitical rivalry, as commonly understood by political scientists, has underlying assumptions: states are the primary actors in the system, a military-economic competition exists between them for the raw materials needed for national power, states can form alliances that are able to "balance" one another either through physical occupation or by securing political influence within a geographical space, and that geography represents perhaps the greatest determinant of political relationships. Under this understanding, geographic entities must be strategically contested to have geopolitical relevance.⁷

What is at stake in the intense East-West rivalry being played out on African scene is the immense wealth of African oil and minerals, which are key to the national security of Western powers as well as to the economic growth of China. As in traditional geopolitical games, the players use hard power (to instill fear to those who control the territory) and soft power (to capture the hearts and minds of those who own the coveted resources). However, instead of competing for actual control over a geographic area, oil contracts, mining concessions, pipelines routes, petroleum consortiums, are the prizes of this form of "New Great Game".⁸ The protagonists defend cultural values to enlist the support of local population, create cultural allegiance or disrupt any likely source of affinity of the target communities with the geostrategic opponent. In that respect, the much repeated accusations about China's dealings with authoritarian regimes in Africa are undoubtedly part and parcel of this jostling for political influence on the continent as a means to legitimize their own approach to accessing African natural resources.

Each of the major players has taken a different approach to this race. While China has mainly used trade and infrastructure construction projects to create new growth dynamics, both France and the US have stepped up their military and diplomatic involve-

7 Michael Mayer, "What is 'geopolitics'? In search of conceptual clarity", *Geopolitics in the High North*, 2013, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45:article2&showall=1 (Accessed on 10 March 2014).

8 Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia*, Basic Books, 2006.

ment in Africa in order to maintain their entrenched vital interests in African oil and key minerals and curb ascending Chinese influence.⁹ In order to better coordinate its new military and diplomatic engagement in Africa for an optimal protection of its priority access to resources the US has reorganized its overseas military command structure to create the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), by which it has concluded some form of military agreements with all countries except Sudan and Somalia.

As for France, it keeps military bases in oil-rich Gabon, Ivory Coast, Chad and Central African Republic, vestiges of the military agreements that regulated its relations with its former colonies during the high tide days of the *Françafrique* policy. The current French military operation in Mali as well as its recent involvements in wars in Libya and Ivory Coast (all of which have oil reserves and/or strategic minerals) suggests that Paris, like Washington, is determined to deploy its military power in order to protect its vital interests and help curb the growing Chinese influence on the continent.

La Françafrique: Foccart's Secret Networks and "Black Governors"

In post-independence Africa, the pattern of foreign influence has mainly been shaped by the inheritances of the colonial system and the legacy of the Cold War.¹⁰ The trade relationships inherited from the colonial era resulted in the perpetuation of a ruthless exploitation of African resources by Western oil and mining companies, accompanied by large-scale environment degradation.¹¹ This exploitation system that still characterizes much of the relationships between African countries and their former European colonial rulers was established in the logic of international labor division, in which colonies served as repositories for natural resources and raw materials for the industries of the metropolis. Because of the security imperatives of the cold war, Western powers have judged it indispensable to prolong it even after nominal independence was granted to African countries.

During the Cold War period, France enjoyed an unchallenged position of influence in many resource-rich African countries with US tacit consent. As explained by Patrick Benquet, France had been entrusted (in secret dealings with the United States with the complicit silence of other Western allies) with the mission to ideologically police the African continent in order to block any potential progression of communist ideas on the continent. This allowed France to exert considerable influence of African politics and exploit it as it wished.¹² Energy security concerns and defense technology considerations of the Cold War prompted Western colonial powers to delegate powers to France

9 Klare and Volman, "America, China and the Scramble for Africa's Oil", p. 297-309.

10 Richard Reid, "Horror, Hubris and Humanity: The International Engagement with Africa, 1914-2014", *International Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 1, 2014, p. 143-165.

11 "Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta", *EAGE Report*, 25 January 2000, <http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/report/> (Accessed on 10 March 2014).

12 Patrick Benquet, "Françafrique: Raison d'Etat", Documentary film broadcast on French National Channel France2 on July 20, 2012. Available on: <http://vimeo.com/3353051>.

to prevent the Soviet Union from getting any access to African fossil energy and other strategic resources like uranium, cobalt and coltan.¹³ This was because the West was afraid of the consequences of losing control of vast energy and mineral resources of its African colonies to the leaders of the independence movements. At the onset of the Cold War, they conceived a sophisticated strategy that would enable them to keep effective long-run preferential exploitation of African oil and strategic minerals even after the unavoidable independence of various African countries. More in particular, the so-called Africa policy put in place by France's President Charles De Gaulle at the dawn of African independence played a decisive role in the merciless implementation of this neo-colonial exploitation strategy. Under President De Gaulle and all his successors, France used this position as a gendarme of the continent with the help of unscrupulous Africans political figures to assassinate independence leaders, protect dictatorships and foment civil wars in many parts of Africa in order to keep a tight hand on natural resources as a reward for its ideological policing mission.

Based on direct relationships between African heads of state and the President of France, this policy involved large scale corruption, military coups, occult financing, and secret military assistance agreements giving France a preferential access to strategic resources in exchange for the protection of autocratic regimes. The selected African rulers who helped implement it were adulated and praised by consecutive French governments of the Vth republic since De Gaulle as "preferred friends of France". Red carpets were rolled out for them and all sort of flatteries were thrown at them all across France's Western allies, who also benefitted from this system¹⁴. This neo-colonial system has come to be known under its nickname *Françafrique*¹⁵, meaning a policy that keeps (French speaking) Africa integrated with France. Those new friends of France were mockingly called the "*black governors*" in Paris by the French agents of Foccart's secret service networks to underscore that they were administering their countries on behalf of France in the same way as colonial administrators appointed by France had done before independence.

13 Cobalt is an essential mineral for the manufacture of modern weaponry. It is required for the construction of jet fighter and bomber engines, missiles (including nuclear warhead missiles), and battleships, including nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and virtually all modern industrially manufactured weapons of war. Cobalt is also essential for the manufacture of anything requiring high grade steel. As for coltan, it is the ore from which tantalum is extracted, a rare mineral used for the production of video-game consoles, laptop computers, and mobile phones because of its high energy capacitance. According to data from the US Mineral Commodity Summaries (US Department of the Interior), more than 50% of the world's reserves of cobalt and 80% of world's coltan deposits are situated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

14 Despite this deceptive flattery to lure unsuspecting or corrupt African politicians, De Gaulle is mostly notorious for having said: '*Les états n'ont pas d'amis; ils n'ont que des intérêts*' (States have no friends, they have only interests).

15 The term *Françafrique*, meaning the interconnection between France and French speaking Africa, was coined by Félix Houphouët Boigny, President of Côte d'Ivoire between 1960 and 1997, one of the main black pillars of De Gaulle's Africa policy.

For this exploitation system to hold, France engineered a sophisticated strategy to eliminate any recalcitrant leaders and use the huge profits generated by the looted resources to finance repressive regimes that accepted to collaborate in this plunder. Based on a two-pronged approach consisting of political control and industrial exploitation of former colonies, this policy enabled France to continue the colonial system of quasi free extraction of African oil and minerals under the disguise of development assistance and military cooperation. To implement this strategy, De Gaulle enlisted the help of two highly skilled collaborators, who shared a staunch determination to acquire African resources for France, with a total disregard of the human toll that their ambitious actions would exact on African populations: Jacques Foccart for the political control of African leaders and Pierre Guillaumat for the industrial system to exploit African oil and gas. Foccart, who was in charge of the president's Africa policy at the Elysée Palace, immediately put in place a sophisticated network of highly devoted and pitiless agents and diplomats from the French secret service (*Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage-SDECE*). Secret agents, military officers and diplomat were seconded to Africa as advisers of the leaders of the newly independent states. Under the pretense of sending technical assistants and political advisers to the administration of the newly independent African states, Foccart sent a whole network of informants who controlled the chosen allied rulers to ensure that they act in line with French interests. Through their position in all sectors of the local administration, these informants provided Foccart and the French president with all the information they needed to keep African presidents and prime ministers under control. French diplomats and secret agents deployed their talents to help undermine or even eliminate Pan-African independence leaders when asked to do so by Paris. They also served for the selection and control of post-independence autocratic rulers, who fitted the required profile to serve Western interests. This secret network, operating outside any parliamentary control, was the political pillar of this strategy.

The industrial pillar of De Gaulle's strategy was the creation of a French national oil company, which would exploit oil in the former colonies to ensure France's energy independence. To that end, he had charged the military engineer Pierre Guillaumat with the creation of a research center for the development of French oil industry. Guillaumat set up the *Bureau de Recherche du Pétrole* (BRP) as early as 1945. Through a series of mergers, this BRP would later evolve to become ELF (*Essences et Lubrifiants de France*), the well-known French state-owned oil company.¹⁶ ELF's first oil fields were in Algerian Sahara, then still firmly under French colonization. However, after Algeria declared independence in 1962 following a bloody war of liberation, France was cut off from its Saharan oil fields. ELF successfully developed the newly discovered oil fields in Gabon and with the help of Foccart's networks, transformed its African operations into a very lucrative business. Libreville, the capital of Gabon, became therefore the main operation base for French intelligence services in Africa from which many Afri-

16 After a merger, ERP became ERAP (*Entreprise de recherches et d'activités pétrolières*) and subsequent mergers led to the creation of ELF.

can leaders would be destabilized, killed or protected, each case depending on France's economic and strategic interests.

Throughout the 50 years that followed African independence until its managed wind down owing to corruption scandals, ELF would play a central role in the execution of this strategy, by channeling its huge profits from African oil fields to French and African politicians. Huge oil profits also served to provide funding and weapons to be used for the removal and assassination of undesirable African leaders or for the training and military support for various rebel movements in resource-rich areas that France coveted, like the Biafra secession war in Nigeria or the Angolan civil war.¹⁷ ELF's money would also serve to finance the political campaigns of all major political parties in France and to enrich the allied African autocrats through secret accounts in European banks. This complex system designed to benefit the entire political elite in France as well as corrupt African autocrats, was crafted in such a way that no political party had any incentive to denounce it.¹⁸

Development aid was also deliberately used as part of this strategy to create the illusion that financial resources were flowing from the generous developed countries in Europe to poor underdeveloped ones in Africa. While every penny of development assistance was put in the spotlight, the far more important flows of African oil and strategic minerals under secret defense accords were kept under silence and African wealth was quietly siphoned to the West in exchange for this aid¹⁹. The political misconceptions created by this deceptive misrepresentation of the North-South relationships has continued to have a significant bearing on the failure of many African countries to use the abundant resources to improve the living conditions of their citizens.

As shown by Michael Maren, aid has been the main characteristic and vehicle of neo-colonialism in the relations between Africa and its Western partners. It has mainly been used to serve the political objectives of the donors and has enabled recipient government to evade accountability to their own citizens.²⁰ In the best hours of the *Françafrique*,

17 For example, as documented by Patrick Benquet, the assassination of Cameroones independence leader Felix Moumié, as well as efforts to overthrow presidents Sékou Touré of Guinea and Matthieu Kerekou of Benin were orchestrated by French secret services with operational bases in Libreville, Gabon. Later, other leaders who were perceived not to be sufficiently subservient of French interests, such as Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Pascal Lissouba of Congo or Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast, were eliminated or ousted from power with French complicity and military intervention.

18 The functioning of this complex system came to light in 1994 when the political rivalry between Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur for the French presidential elections led to the discovery of a vast system of money laundering, corruption and illegal political campaign financing involving ELF's top executives and French political leaders, the so-called ELF scandal, which resulted in the dismantling of Elf and its integration into its much smaller private competitor, Total.

19 In De Gaulle's own declaration: *All these underdeveloped countries that yesterday still depended on us but are now our preferred friends, are requesting our help and our assistance. But why would we give this help and this assistance if it was not worth it?* Free translation from French by authors.

20 Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity*,

aid and development assistance mainly served to protect befriended regimes and to finance white elephant projects for the prestige of allied autocrats. Priority access to strategic resources was usually the reward to the donor as confessed by Maurice Robert.²¹ In the framework of Western policy towards Africa, development assistance has thus been a powerful instrument for covering up this sophisticated looting strategy and as such, it has contributed to the perpetuation of poor governance practices.²² The failure of development aid to bring economic benefits to African populations, often presented in the literature as Cold War blunders or African institutional failure, should be viewed here as part and parcel of an intended outcome by Western powers seeking to keep their influence. Politically motivated aid allowed France to maintain a dominant position on the political scene of its former colonies to the extent that the nefarious consequences of French neo-colonial hegemony are still strongly felt in many parts of Africa until today²³. With the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the shameful failure of the Mali's African partners to protect it from the jihadist threat, France was provided a new legitimacy to pursue these nefarious policies of the past and to present itself once again as an indispensable savior of its former colonies. It suffers no doubt that French military intervention in Mali is intimately linked to its own interest in this region of vital strategic value, rich in gold, oil and uranium on which the French nuclear energy industry is directly dependent. With a massive support not only from the US, but also from many of its European allies, including Germany, Denmark UK and Belgium, France's new military presence in Africa to ascertain Western economic and security interests further adds to an already growing militarization of the continent at a time when it needed peace to keep the growth momentum.

The US AFRICOM

With the end of the Cold War, the policing mission the West had given to France on the black continent came to an end, and with it the unchallenged monopoly over the natural resources also ended. A sort of new scramble for Africa was engaged, in which the US, European countries and later, China, saw their chance to try to seize their slice of the "African cake". Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, acknowledged the national security implications of African oil during a visit to Nigeria in July 2002.²⁴ Especially the US reacted to the growing importance of African resources in its national security calculations by significantly reinforcing its alliances with African rulers

New York, The Free Press, 2002.

21 Maurice Robert, *Le Ministre de l'Afrique: Mémoires d'un homme de l'ombre*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2004.

22 Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a better Way for Africa*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

23 The current military involvement in Mali the recent crisis in Ivory Coast and the recurrent unrest in the Central African Republic are some examples of the still ongoing involvement of France in African politics.

24 Kansteiner declared: 'African oil is of strategic national interest to us,' he declared, and 'it will increase and become even more important as we go forward'; Klare and Volman, "America, China & the Scramble for Africa's Oil", p. 297-309.

and increased its military involvement on the continent to ensure an optimal protection of its direct strategic interests.²⁵

Being the incumbent, France has been trying to defend its entrenched interest by adapting its policies to the changing circumstances to limit the losses due to American jostling. In some key locations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, it has nonetheless been overwhelmed by strong Anglo-Saxon takeover, but it has retained prominence in most of its own former colonies.

Alliance with Israel played a key role in supporting US penetration in the heart of resource-rich regions. Israeli think-tanks like the Institute of Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS) have also played a major role in shaping U.S. geo-strategy in Africa. The IASPS for example, which is also at the basis of the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG), was one of the Israeli organizations supporting the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).²⁶ The impetus for the creation of AFRICOM was thus given by AOPIG recommendations as an instrument for the implementation of the strategy to control African oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea.²⁷

Israel is also actively involved in securing the contacts and agreements needed by the US for the extension of its interests in Africa through Israeli business links and intelligence operations in Africa. The US military, now acting under the new AFRICOM umbrella, have been conducting joint military training operations in more than 36 African nations, and the number of Special Forces active on the continent is constantly growing. In addition to the hot-spots of the fight against Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabab militia in the horn of Africa, US Special Forces are constantly involved in military-to military relations in oil-rich nations such as Nigeria, Uganda, Chad and South Sudan. In parallel to this growing militarization, American oil companies are also becoming more actively involved in extractive operations, reflecting the growing importance Africa has taken in US energy policy. African oil supplies to the US have exceeded USD 85 billion in 2008 and Exxon Mobil has become the second biggest oil producer in Africa just behind French Total Elf.

The US has based its Africa engagement strategy on forging alliances with African strong men and increasing its military involvement on the continent. Under Clinton admin-

25 In a report titled "African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development", the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) identified African oil and key minerals as being of vital interest for US national security and recommended the Bush administration to undertake strategic actions aimed at ensuring unimpeded access to these resources. According to data from the US Department of Energy, Africa now supplies the US with roughly the same quantity of oil as the Middle East. Cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo is equally strategically important for the advanced defence industry.

26 "African Oil: A Priority for US National Security and African Development", *Institute of Advanced Strategic & Political Studies*, Seminar Report, 25 January 2002, Washington, D.C.

27 According to the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (2002), the major reason for the Bush administration to seek the increase of U.S. access to African oil was an attempt to reduce U.S. vulnerability to supply disruptions caused by Middle Eastern instability as much as possible by diversifying the supply sources.

istration the US initiated a policy publicly promoting what president Clinton called 'a new breed of African leaders' during his visit in Africa in March 1998, including Museveni of Uganda, Kagame of Rwanda, Zenawi of Ethiopia and Afewerki of Eritrea, who turned out to be violent autocrats not hesitating to go at one another's throat in bloody wars²⁸. This approach aimed to ensure the protection of its direct post-Cold War strategic interests by sheer projection of military might and low-intensity warfare has enabled it to deter potential rivals²⁹.

Especially since the deployment of AFRICOM in 2008, the renewed US interest in African strategic resources has reshaped the way the US interacts with African countries. The US has forged military alliances all across Africa, where it has established military-to-military cooperation and from where it conducts surveillance and counterinsurgency operations. Currently, AFRICOM is still headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, but has military facilities in Mauritania and Burkina Faso, where PC-6 and PC-12 surveillance planes track the movements of AQIM, bases in Seyshelles and Arba-Minch, Ethiopia where Predator drones are stationed and additional bases in Nzara (South Sudan), Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti), Manda-Bay (Kenya) and Kisangani (Democratic Republic of Congo), from where American special forces can intervene in various parts of this region if needed. The number of such alliances and the corresponding operations, especially in oil-rich areas of Nigeria, Uganda, Chad and South Sudan, is rapidly growing.

The new alliances between the United States and the new "breed of African leaders" has supplanted the Cold War's *Françafrique* policy but have retained many of its pernicious features: violence, orchestrated civil wars, assassinations and protection of allied autocrats in exchange for access to strategic minerals.³⁰ This approach to the relations with Africa has been arranged in a way that military and political influence allows Western multinational oil and mining companies to exploit African resources in a non-transparent way, often causing violent conflicts and large-scale environmental degradation in all impunity as documented by Essential Action for Global Exchange.³¹

28 Barely six months after President Clinton returned to the US from his African trip to praise this "new breed of leaders", Zenawi and Afewerki were at war over a small piece of land at Badme. Later, between 1999 and 2000, Museveni's and Kagame's troops clashed three times in fierce battles in Kisangani (DRC) that they had both invaded for the looting of Congolese resources (the role of Museveni and Kagame in the illegal plundering of Congolese mineral wealth has been documented in a UN expert panel report (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/567/36/IMG/N0356736.pdf?OpenElement>)).

29 The projection military power in Africa in the context of rivalry with China is increasingly perceived as being a form of low-intensity warfare, a strategic method developed back in the years of the Reagan administration. For U.S. policy-makers and war planners, low-intensity represents a strategic reorientation of the U.S. military establishment, and a renewed commitment to employ force in overt or covert operations against strategic opponents.

30 As a prominent example of this, the recurrent eruption of violence in the Great lakes region is a direct result of the US support of its military allies Rwanda and Uganda, who play a key role in ensuring that American and other Western mining interest in neighbouring DRC are well protected.

31 "Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta", 25 January 2000.

Although AFRICOM itself defines its mission as having “the administrative responsibility for US military support to US government policy in Africa, to include military-to-military relationships with 53 African nations”, many observers have consistently contended that its primary objective is to disrupt the momentum of Chinese influence in Africa, because preferential access to African resources remains a crucial component of US national security.³² Some Western analysts and government officials point out that both the US and other major powers in the European Union consider China’s advance in Africa as a common threat that needs to be confronted together.³³ This perception of a common adversary has compelled US and its European allies to end their rivalries in Africa and work together in order to articulate a coherent attitude towards China and other emerging global players that may challenge their hegemony over African resources.

Such a need to end internal rivalry explains the close collaboration between US, France and Great Britain in the War in Libya, the current smooth collaboration in “*Opération Serval*” in Mali as well as information sharing between Africom and French army in important operations of shared importance such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative in Western Africa or counterinsurgency operations in the Horn of Africa. This collaboration was accelerated by the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France when he restored the full military integration of France in the NATO command structure for the first time since its suspension by De Gaulle in 1966. It is important to note that this momentum also received Israeli encouragement, because of its mining and business interests in Africa.

As part of this strategy, the US has also applied bilateral and multilateral aid policy instruments to maintain resource-rich African countries in financial dependence.³⁴ Bilateral aid has helped authoritarian US allies to impose their domination on their national political scene, while its withholding has served to punish leaders who were perceived as not being docile enough to US policy objectives. The intervention of Western government-sponsored human rights organizations with connection to the U.S. intelligence and defense have also helped to pave the way for the US projection of military power in many corners of the continent³⁵. Finally, as a multilateral instrument, the International

32 US State Department adviser Peter Pham stated in unequivocal terms in 2007, while justifying Africom’s creation before Congress, saying its purpose was to protect “access to hydrocarbons and other strategic resources which Africa has in abundance, a task which includes ensuring against the vulnerability of those natural riches and ensuring that no other interested third parties, such as India, China, Japan or Russia obtain monopolies or preferential treatment.”

33 See for example Petry, Drew. “Using AFRICOM to Counter China’s Aggressive African Policies” *Airman Scholar*, Fall 2011. See also Bowie, Nile. “AFRICOM Report: Combating China’s Economic Encroachment”, NSNBC, 16 August 2012/ <http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/2012/08/16/africom-report-combating-chinas-economic-encroachment-related-press-release/> (Accessed on 13 December 2013).

34 The disastrous consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) imposed upon African and Latin American countries in the 1980s are a case in point.

35 Keith Harmon Snow, “US Agents of Covert Wars in Africa”, Conscious Being Alliance, 2012 <http://www.consciousbeingalliance.com/2012/08/us-agents-of-covert-war-in-africa/> (Accessed on 15 February 2013).

Monetary Fund (IMF) has equally often been used to impose specific disastrous recommendations to targeted countries in line with US strategic objectives.³⁶

China's Rise in Africa

The most significant challenge to Western hegemony in Africa has come from China, which sought to secure an indispensable access to African raw materials for its insatiable manufacturing industry. Trade volumes in oil and mineral ores have soared since 2002, especially driven by trade deals based on swapping large infrastructure projects for access to natural resources. China has mainly used soft power and aid packages with no strings attached to build confidence among African leaders and the public at large. In terms of access to resources, China seems to have been very successful in connecting with oil and mineral-rich African countries. Chinese oil firms such as China National Petroleum Corporation, (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation, (CNOOC) have massively invested in the African oil and gas industries alongside Western firms and other East Asian firms. With investments worth more than USD 10 billion in 2008 and an additional USD 23 billion contract with Nigeria in 2010, Chinese oil firms are on an impressive growth path in Africa.

Chinese mining companies are also active in various African countries, especially in places like DRC, Zambia and Ethiopia where the so-called “Angola-mode” trade deals have been concluded, whereby China finances the construction of infrastructure projects in exchange for its mining companies getting mining concessions. As a result, trade between China and African countries has grown exponentially to become one of the primary engines of African growth over the past decade. China’s trade with Africa reached \$166 billion in 2011, whereby African exports to China consisting primarily in natural resources rose from \$5.6 billion a decade ago to \$93 billion according to Chinese statistics. The inflow of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) has also started to swell and is expected to reach USD 50 billion for the year 2015, while bilateral trade are predicted to reach USD 3000 billion, according to Standard Bank projections.

Thanks to its considerable financial resources, it has positioned itself as a reliable source of funding for large development projects. In July 2012, China offered African countries USD 20 billion in loans over the next three years, doubling the amounts pledged in the previous three-year period. Through the no-strings-attached approach to aid, it has also provided an alternative source of funding, challenging the monopoly previously held by the IMF on development policies in Africa. Thanks to the thousands of Chinese trad-

36 For example, in 2006 when Congolese president Joseph Kabila negotiated a USD 9 billion trade deal with China involving the rights to exploit copper and cobalt mines in exchange for providing \$6 billion worth of infrastructure, the US was openly upset and threatened to block Congo’s financing through IMF if it did not roll back the contract. A few months later, in October 2006, Rwanda-backed well-armed rebel troops commanded by Nkunda surrounded Goma in North Kivu and demanded that Congo’s President Joseph Kabila negotiate with him. Not surprisingly, among Nkunda’s demands was that Kabila cancel the USD 9 billion deal with China.

ers and workers who moved to Africa, China has successfully established a bridgehead in the heart of resource-rich regions and its influence is growing rapidly in spite of US pressure to discourage African leaders from doing business with China.³⁷

Despite the silent confrontation with Africom for the access to African resources, the Chinese have been far more ingenious by most informed accounts.³⁸ Their development packages have enabled many African governments to emancipate themselves, at least partly, from the stifling constraints of the IMF. Instead of offering savage IMF-dictated austerity and economic chaos as the West has, China has proposed large credits, soft loans to build roads and schools in order to create good will.

Although China has been repeatedly accused by its Western rivals of bringing new form of imperialism and turning a blind eye on gross human rights violations in the countries where it has trade interests, its role in African growth dynamics is still viewed positively by African public and even by some influential African and Western economists, such as Dambisa Moyo and Deborah Brautigam. Accusations of unfair business practices and poor labor conditions in Chinese managed enterprises in Africa have also been a recurrent phenomenon but the existence of such incidents does not seem to significantly affect the more positive view of Chinese investments in Africa as compared to their US or European counterparts.³⁹ Despite pressure by the US on African leaders to be wary of the dangers of Chinese investments and refrain from lucrative trade deals with Chinese firms, Sino-African trade and investment relations are poised to continue to flourish, as long as the complementarities between African natural resources and Chinese infrastructure construction create mutually beneficial growth dynamics.⁴⁰

Turkish Engagement in Africa

Against this backdrop of heightened competition on the African resource market, Turkey has emerged as one of the new players seeking to expand its diplomatic and commercial relations with various African countries. Since 2003, the Turkish government has unveiled a new interest in deepening its relations with Africa and has deployed a powerful diplo-

37 During her first visit in Africa as US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made a speech in Dakar, Senegal, in which she warned African leaders against the 'perils of Chinese investments, which many developmental experts say enrich China at Africa's expense'.

38 Dambisa Moyo, *Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What it Means for the World*, New York, Basic Books, 2012.

39 See Dambisa Moyo, "Beijing, a boon for Africa", *New York Times*, 28 June 2012. See also Deborah Brautigam, "The Chinese in Africa: The Economist Gets Some Things Right, Some Wrong", *China in Africa: The Real Story*, 2011, <http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/05/chinese-in-africa-economist-gets-some.html> (Accessed on 24 February 2013).

40 Richly endowed with natural resources, Africa has a huge unmet demand for infrastructure financing and construction, whereas China has developed one of the world's largest and most competitive construction industries, with particular expertise in the civil works critical for infrastructure development. Given the Chinese need for raw materials to fuel its growth, these complementarities play a key role in the trade between the two parties.

matic arsenal to carve a strategic niche for business exchange with this region of rising economic potential. Ankara's policies towards Africa, aimed primarily at securing profitable export and markets and investment opportunities for its small and medium sized businesses, have therefore followed a path similar to that taken by China. By using the soft power approach Turkey has managed to project an image of partnership of equals with African countries. This approach has so far been successful in expanding Turkey's own influence in Africa as evidenced by exponentially growing trade volumes. Turkey's opening to Africa is explained by some analysts as being the result of both Turkey's domestic transformation and change in the global political economy. The former acted in fostering the relations with Africa by challenging traditional Turkish partners in the economy and striving for trade diversification while the latter prompted the Turkish government to redefine its interests in a newly emerging economic system and drew the attention to the benefits of reorienting foreign policy towards Africa in a multifocal configuration.⁴¹

The main objective of this opening up to Africa was to reshape Turkey's political role and influence in its region and on the global scene. Following a first "African Action Plan" outlined back in 1998 by then Foreign Affairs minister Ismail Cem, the new AKP-led government launched the "Strategy Development of Economic Relationships with Africa" project in 2003 to boost economic relations with various African countries. Since 2005, the year that was declared "The Year of Africa" in the framework of Turkish new multi-axis foreign policy, Turkey has been spending almost as much efforts on the reinforcement of its ties with African countries as on the relations with the EU.⁴² Opening to Africa has never been considered as an attempt at compensating Turkey's uneasy relationship with the European Union. Rather, Turkish decision makers seem to have calculated that the deeper Turkey gets into the African continent, akin to Turkish engagement in Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia, the more leverage Ankara would have vis-a-vis European capitals, and vice versa. Under this framework, the "Africa Policy" encompasses multiple dimensions, including developing new diplomatic relations and fostering cooperation in the political, economic and cultural domains.

Examining Turkey's approach to Africa it becomes clear that Turkey does not suffer from a colonial past, as well as any negativities seen in its decades-long relationship with western actors. Neither the issues of human rights and the level of democracy nor such political problems as the Cyprus dispute or the so-called 'Armenian genocide' haunt Turkey's engagement with African countries. That is to say that Turkey, unlike western actors, seems to act on a clean plate in Africa. Turkey's relations with African countries are unlikely to impact its relations with western actors either positively or negatively. Africa has never been a playing ground of Turkish foreign policy in the sense that the way how Turkey engages the continent affects its accession process with the European Union or its presence within NATO. Instead, similar to many other non-western rising powers,

41 Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's Rising Role in Africa", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No.4, 2010, p. 93-205.

42 Sema Kalaycioglu, "Between Mission and Business: Turkey's New Approach to Africa", *Journal of US-China Public Administration*. Vol.8, No.11, 2001, p. 1288-1297.

Turkey's engagement in Africa can easily be explained or justified in the context of the emergent dynamics of post-western global politics.

Africa has warmed up for this new partnership and welcomed Turkish initiatives to intensify business and diplomatic ties. In that "Year of Africa", Turkey gained the status of African Union (AU) observer country and was declared a "strategic partner"⁴³ during the AU summit held in Addis Ababa in 2008. In a move similar to that undertaken by the Chinese authorities, Turkey organized the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul on August 18-21, 2008, in which the heads of states and governments from most African countries took part. This summit resulted in the adoption of: "The Istanbul Declaration on Africa-Turkey Partnership: Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future" and the "Framework of Cooperation for Africa-Turkey Partnership", two documents which set out a framework for partnership and identified the priority areas of cooperation. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa has reached to more than 30 over the last decade and the total volume of bilateral trade is now around USD 17 billion.

In tandem with the political charm offensive, the business sector has also undertaken important initiatives to stimulate contacts between Turkish and African entrepreneurs and investors. Turkish Airlines (THY) has taken the lead by expanding its route networks to include many new destinations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Private sector initiatives are led by the Turkish Federation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) which has held "Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge" summits every year since 2005 to encourage matchmaking of businesspeople from the 54 African countries. Aid and development assistance have also been part of Turkey engagement in Africa. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and some non-governmental organization have been increasingly active across the continent.⁴⁴ As an important aspect of Turkish African relations, funding education has received a strong emphasis in key African nations. Numerous Turkish schools, funded mainly through private business associations, have been opened in various parts of the continent to sow the seeds of goodwill and educate potential future business partners who will be familiar with Turkish language and culture. Similarly, Turkish universities, both state-funded and private, have turned out to become a popular destination of African students.

It is also worthwhile to note that these tandem initiatives by both Turkish policy makers and private sector seem to work well as a result of a tacit alliance between the networks of business associations and the ruling AK Party. Turkish-African trade relations have opened growing African export markets and investment opportunities, which have already proved to generate important sources of growth for Turkish business networks called "Anatolian Tigers". These networks that are poised to benefit most from the opening up to Africa are also known to be part of a strong political support base for the ruling party.

43 See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

44 Güner Özkan and Mustafa Turgut Demirtepe, "Transformation of a development aid agency: TIKA in a changing domestic and international setting", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2012, p. 647-664.

Implications of Turkish Engagement for the East-West Rivalry

Turkey's engagement in Africa has followed an independent path, so far unconstrained by its Western NATO alliance membership. Turkey's relations with Africa are primarily driven by the pragmatic recognition of its own interest and its new status as a political player with global reach. Although diplomatic pressure can be expected to eventually try to pull Turkey into the Western approach to the relations with Africa, Turkey has a number of distinctive characteristics that would render such a move detrimental to its own interests.

The first point to underline in the context of Turkey's engagement with Africa is that compared to other global actors, Turkey does not suffer from a colonial past. Being the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled much of the northern Africa for ages, Turkey also benefit from its Muslim identity. That Turkey gained its territorial independence against the same colonial powers also strikes a sympathetic chord with the African people. Turkish diplomatic approach towards Africa seems to pay a great amount of attention to the fact that its engagement with the continent should be equally owned by the African counterparts and Turkey's policies should not be seen as colonialist. Turkey has therefore a comparative advantage in building sound trade relations with Africa without resorting to military power as in the approach taken by France and the US.

Secondly, Turkey's entry to Africa is a 21st century phenomenon. During the Cold War years, Africa did not appear on Turkey's radar screens. Turkey has therefore limited experience in Africa's political dynamics in comparison to France and the US. The more assertive approach towards Africa is intimately linked to AKP government foreign policy vision of a diplomacy based on "equal partnership" attitude in a global order undergoing significant mutations. The emergence of new global players, of which Turkey is a prime example, brings with it more options to choose from, and lowers the potential of pressure to support the policy of the status quo.

Thirdly, as a medium-sized actor in international politics, Turkey's African opening is a well-orchestrated attempt at globalizing Turkey's international outlook with all the responsibilities such a role conceptualization would bring with itself. Turkish leaders see their engagement with Africa as part of Turkey's historical and moral responsibility to help Africans get out of their current unfavorable situation of underdevelopment, corruption, hunger, drought, famine and mal-governance. Turkish activism in Somalia is a case in point. It is mainly through the agency of Turkish rulers that the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia have recently come to the global agenda. Turkish diplomats incessantly underline this role and support for the growing militarization would be greatly at odds with the policy objectives and the image the country has of itself.

Given the many similarities between the Turkish approach and the Chinese engagement in Africa, increasing trade relations with Africa under the current vision can be seen as a reinforcement of the Chinese position. In terms of trade and investment flows, however, Turkish engagement in Africa is still heavily dwarfed by China and even India and Korea. Cumulative amount of Turkish investments made in various parts of Africa

since 2003 was 16 billion at the end of 2008.⁴⁵ Comparable numbers for Chinese investments are estimated at more than USD 50 billion and they are expected to grow very rapidly according to Standard Bank's estimates.

Conclusion

Africa's sizeable reserves of strategically important resources have been one of the primary factors in its relations with the rest of the world. During the colonial period, European colonial powers exploited oil and precious minerals freely for their own economic benefits but with the dawn of independence in the Cold-War context, African oil and minerals that were crucial for the defense industry became the object of a strategic rivalry between the incumbent colonial powers and the Soviet Union. Even after nominal independence was granted to African countries, secret agreements in the Western alliance allowed France to keep an influential position beyond its former colonies and to enjoy a preferential access to those key resources. After the end of the Cold War, the security considerations that had given France a quasi-monopoly position over African resources disappeared and Africa became the object of geostrategic rivalry between France and the US, whereby the latter significantly increased its ties to resource-rich countries, often at the expense of its incumbent rival.

With the rise of China and other emerging powers, the rivalry seems to have shifted again, with France and other European powers willing to cooperate with the US in order to face what they see as a common threat from the growing Chinese influence on the African resource market. Ongoing discoveries of new oil reserves in various part of Africa and the arrival of new emerging players challenging the Western hegemony have propelled the US to step up the continent's militarization. Clashes with its Asian competitors can only be expected to increase in the future. Being the main challenger of the Western hegemony on the African resource market, China has now become the principal target of the new rivalry. The US has reinforced its military presence on the continent and urged African leaders to be wary of Chinese investments, warning them in hardly veiled terms against the dangers of doing business with China. According to William Engdahl, AFRICOM's military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy, today, are clearly aimed squarely at blocking China's growing economic presence in the region⁴⁶. As a result, *many analysts expect that African countries rich in oil and minerals will increasingly become a theatre for strategic competition between the United States and China, as both countries seek to expand their influence and secure access to resources.*

45 Kalaycioglu, "Between Mission and Business: Turkey's New Approach to Africa", p.1288-1297.

46 William Engdahl, "China and the Congo Wars: AFRICOM. America's New Military Command" *Centre for Research on Globalization*, 2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-and-the-congo-wars-africom-america-s-new-military-command/11173> (Accessed on 15 February 2013).

Turkish involvement in Africa is a new phenomenon, but it has largely followed an approach similar to that taken by China with a growing success. In the face of the recent escalation of African militarization against the backdrop of US-China rivalry, Turkey's engagement in Africa has the potency to influence the balance of power outcome. Given the mounting pressure from the US on most allies to deflect the momentum of Chinese rising power, Turkey may be pushed in a dilemma position with strategic option leading to contradictory implications for its strive for more Westernization and its direct business interests in Africa. Based on its own capacity and political and economic objectives, Turkey's success in its dealings with Africa depends heavily on the prosperity of African economies, which forms the main engine of the demand for Turkish export products. For Africa to prosper however, a flourishing trade with China is more indispensable than a growing militarisation. In determining its choices as a global swing state, Turkey may thus come to realise that rather than being an undesirable competition, a booming trade between Africa and China may hold the key to Turkey's own successes in its African engagement.

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Turkey as a model for the Middle East and North African (MENA) states: realistic or wishful thinking?

Bahri Yılmaz

We are currently witnessing historic changes in the Middle Eastern and North African states (MENA), which are destined to transform the region. It is a common belief in the West that authoritarian regimes are leaving the political arena one after another and anti-democratic regimes and institutions could be easily replaced by the newly elected reformist and western-oriented governments characterized as the so-called 'Moderate Islam'. This conclusion is very optimistic, and convincing reasons are needed to make such predictions about the regimes.

Profound historic changes have recently taken place in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. After the assassination of Colonel Qaddafi in Libya and the resulting civil unrest, it is no longer clear who governs the country, making it hard to deal with armed elements who fought against the old regime and want to take a share in the power. In Egypt, the recently elected President Mohamed Morsi, a leading member in the Muslim Brotherhood was ruling the country, but now the military has taken over power. Its rule of the country has been marked with violence and demonstrations against the military government continue with increasing violence in Tahrir Square; in Syria Bashar al-Asad is still in power: nobody knows how

the chaotic situation will come to an end. In Yemen, the situation is also unclear; and in the other Arab countries the old regimes carry on in power. Obviously, it will take a long time before these countries recover from the economic, social and political disasters caused by former regimes and current revolts.

From the beginning of the Mediterranean uprisings and the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Turkey's leadership has been actively involved in the events, sometimes alone and sometimes in collaboration with Western countries. Turkey's new foreign policy draws a great deal of attention from America and Europe. *Newsweek* highlighted the role of Turkey in the region as follows: "...with Turkey flexing its muscles, we may soon face a revived Ottoman Empire"¹. *The Economist* similarly overstate Turkey's new role in the region stating that "...Arabs looked in Turkey for inspiration. Turkey is not just a fellow country but their former imperial power"².

In this context, two critical questions can be asked: first, how has Turkey's Middle East policy changed? And secondly, can Turkey serve as a model to the MENA countries, which has been suggested both by the United States and the European Union³?

The Ottoman Empire stretching from the Adriatic Sea to Yemen ruled the Middle East and North Africa for more than 400 years. After its collapse in 1918, the newly founded Republic of Turkey rose in 1923. In the early years, Turkey faced very serious economic, political and social problems. Under the leadership of Atatürk, reforms were initiated with the intent of transforming the economic

and political structures inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The main goal of Turkey's new republican elites, predominantly high ranking military officers who had served in the Ottoman army, was to build a modern state and to shed the Ottoman legacy. Three of these revolutionary reforms were beyond question vitally important for an Islamic society: introducing secularism, upgrading the status of women and the adoption and implementation of a European legal system.

Since the late 1940s, all Turkish governments have given top priority to Western institutions and their foreign and security policies have favoured cooperation with the West as opposed to the Middle East. Thus the so-called "Westernisation" process aimed at catching up with European civilisation and the full integration of the country into Europe in all realms once and for all. Thanks to its pro-western policy, Turkey became a member of western political, economic and security institutions such as NATO and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development(OECD). Turkey's application for membership into the European Union in 1959 predates those of most present member states.

Consequently, Turkey's post-1923 orientation towards the West was only one aspect of its new policy. The other was a changed attitude towards the Middle East. Turkey combined its embracing of the West with a distancing of itself from the Middle East. Thus, the weight of Turkey's foreign policy predominantly lay in the Western hemisphere and its ties with the region were slackened.

There are various factors that played a

decisive role in the alienation from the Middle East and shift to the West. The pro-western elite including the leadership of the newly established Republic was strongly convinced, as it remains, that Turkey can only catch up with Western civilization if the country continues to reject the basing of the state on Islamic principles. Secularism was and still is used as a tool for the elimination of Islamic influences on politics and society and it was considered a pre-condition for becoming part of the European civilisation. In addition, recent historical and contemporary experiences between Turkey and the Arab World have been negative and Ninety years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, despite being largely unfounded, mutual suspicions persist. Thus, for a long time reciprocal mistrust was evident between Turkey and the Arab States. Another factor was the emergence of the state of Israel in 1948. Turkey was one of the first Muslim countries to recognise Israel officially in 1949. As a consequence, Arab countries associated Turkey with anti-Islamic sentiments, Israel-friendly policies and the support of Western powers in the region. For more than eighty years, Turkey's Middle East policy was driven above all by the principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of the other countries in the region.

What has changed?

The Turkish economy has demonstrated a tremendous growth and remarkable recovery after the 2001 economic and financial crisis. In the period from 2002 to 2008, the Turkish economy grew impressively,

at an average of 7.3 percent annually. Its GDP reached approximately US\$750 billion, and the GDP per capita rose to approximately US\$10,067 in 2010. Today, Turkey has the world's sixteenth largest economy and it is a member of the G-20. Furthermore, it is the sixth strongest economy in Europe.

The impressive economic performance between 2002 and 2008 is due, not only to a favourable international environment based on expanding world trade, relatively low inflation, low interest rates and a strong demand for emerging market assets, but also the implementation of a structural reform process, sound fiscal and monetary policies, all of which led to macroeconomic stability. All this is thanks to the external anchor of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union, and finally to the reform of economic institutions under the pressure of external anchors and the full engagement and participation of the state apparatus in the reform process.

This high economic growth rates are strongly related to the remarkable export performance of a new class of entrepreneurs called the 'Anatolian Tigers' who are located outside the big industrial and commercial power centres in Anatolia. This newly emerged business class can be referred to as the Islamic Calvinists. The famous German sociologist Max Weber regarded Calvinism as the main source of the capitalist spirit, since it made it possible to "worship God and Mammon at the same time"⁴. Turkey's new business class seems to be able to combine its economic activities with Islamic principles and the rules of the capitalist game. The Anatolian Tigers stand for economic

liberalism: profit-orientation and global operations, while their social and cultural relations are conservative, preferring an Islamic identity to a national secular identity.

There are two main reasons for Turkey's rapprochement with the Middle East. First, the world economy is currently going through its deepest recession since the Great Depression, which started in 1929. Economies around the world have been heavily affected by the financial crisis. As a consequence, the demand for Turkey's export goods has diminished, especially in the European markets. In order to create new markets to make up for the lack of demand in Turkey's traditional trading partners, Ankara has created a "free trade zone without visa restrictions" under the motto "zero problems with neighbouring countries"⁵. Ankara intensified its bilateral trade relations with neighbouring countries regardless of their political system and leadership. Secondly, the present government has discovered the strong and two-way relationship between economic and political relations. Ankara's intention is to build up its foreign relations on stable economic grounds, which are called trade driven external relations. But this is only possible if the markets can be expanded in the MENA countries. The share of export of MENA countries in Turkey's total export rose from 13 percent in 2002 to around 20.7 percent in 2011⁶.

Besides the economic factors, other features have played an important role in Turkey's changed relations with the MENA countries, and Turkey's EU membership has been postponed indefinitely because of the resistance of some EU

member states. This disappointment has slowed down the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels. In addition the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged from an Islamic movement and a pro-Islamic party. The party members and its sympathisers feel great empathy with Arab countries since they share their religiosity and the same faith. Therefore, it is easier for the leadership of the AK PARTY to intensify its economic relations with neighbouring Muslim countries than it would be for a different government to do. Finally, the confidence backed by economic success allows the present government headed by Erdoğan to take the role of global player in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

What role can Turkey play in the MENA region?

After the initial uncertainty as to what stance to take, the EU members and the United States, particularly the former French President Sarkozy and U.S. President Obama, decided to support the reformist movements in the region. For economic and security reasons, the European Union and the United States have a great interest in the stability of the MENA countries. Both countries are looking for strategic partners that are reliable and ready to collaborate with Brussels and Washington. They could also act as mediators and help negotiate the transformation process in the Islamic countries smoothly and successfully.

In this respect, Turkey and Israel come to mind: Turkey as a NATO member and partially democratised Muslim country, and Israel as a strategic partner of the

West. But due to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's close relations with the West, Israel is out of the question as a mediator with the countries of the Mashreq. This unresolved conflict constitutes a serious barrier to the improvement of political and economic relations in the region.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been regarded as a strategic partner by both the EU and U.S. administrations. Turkey is a member of NATO, but at the same time is regarded as an integral part of the Middle East. As such, it has common borders with several crucial countries such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Yet Turkey is also an Islamic country and its inhabitants share their faith with the populations of Arab countries and Iran. Therefore, the West can more easily democratise the authoritarian regimes in the region via Turkey than from Europe. The failed attempt at democratizing Iraq by America and Britain has left a political and security vacuum in the region, which Turkey could fill on behalf of the West. Finally, Ankara would make a good mediator since it has been intensifying its economic and political relations with the MENA countries since 2002 and, as a consequence, is more involved in the events of the region than any previous Turkish government.

The EU and Mediterranean Partnership

The Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (BP/EMP) was initiated in 1995 to provide foreign policy instruments for handling the EU's southern neighbourhood. The BP/EMP aims at creating an area of peace, stability and prosperity. But the results so far have been poor. Former French President

Sarkozy had tried to replace the Barcelona Process with the concept of a Union of the Mediterranean. The reasons for the failure of the Barcelona Process is that the enlargement waves of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 have added twelve new members to the European Union, ten of which are ex-Soviet states situated in Central and Eastern Europe. This massive, eastern-oriented enlargement induced the European Commission to introduce a Wider Europe through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to establish a secure and coherent neighbourhood along its new borders in the East. Although the ENP aims at including both the East and the South of Europe, the pro-Eastern policy preferences of the newly admitted member states along with Germany caused the ENP to pay more attention to the East at the expense of the South. This affects the present and future of the BP/EMP negatively.

There is not yet a well-defined European security and foreign policy regarding the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. As a close partner of the Atlantic alliance in the European Union, the British government continues to cooperate with Washington in order to establish security and to foster modernization in the region. Each member country follows its own interests and takes its own decisions, as seen in the Iraq war in 2003. Only Euro-Mediterranean member states such as France, Spain, and Italy seem to be more involved due to their geographic proximity to the MENA countries. The European Union as a whole still considers Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and as a bulwark against the growing danger of Islamic

fundamentalism, illegal migration and terrorism.

The question, therefore, is how the cooperation between Ankara and Brussels can be improved. Brussels intends to keep the negotiation over Turkey's EU membership and a strategic partnership as two separate issues. This means that Brussels wants to collaborate with Turkey in a Middle East policy within the framework of a strategic partnership but without promising full EU membership. Ankara wants to combine the EU negotiation process with a strategic partnership since it is not interested in close cooperation in Middle East policies in the framework of a strategic partnership alone.

The role of the USA in the region

The United States supports Israel militarily and economically without any restraints and is solely interested in security matters and the fighting of terrorist activities. Another important policy aim of Washington is to protect the energy sources and supply of oil produced in the Arab Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, namely the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Iraq⁷.

The United States and the European Union agree that the Arab world or the wider Mediterranean region should become more democratic. However, they have different approaches to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. American and Israeli commentators tend to claim that as long as Arab states cannot create democratic states it would be premature, to resume serious peace efforts in the Middle East. European policy makers,

on the other hand, are willing to support reform-minded forces in these countries to resolve the conflicts through dialogue, material support and forms of conditionality.

Brussels and Washington are of the common opinion that Turkey's growing strategic importance shows its ability to be a worthy representative of the interest of the West to overcome the conflicts. President Obama and his administration have changed their attitude towards Turkey witnessed by their early consultations with Ankara concerning the revolutions in Egypt and Libya. U.S.-Turkish relations are now closer than during former President Bush's era. Turkey was among the few regional states consulted and Ankara's growing influence in the Middle East is now widely acknowledged. Washington also aims to balance Iran's growing weight in the region with the help of Turkey.

Turkey as a role model for MENA countries: can Turkey live up to high expectations?

Western experts, politicians and journalists hold up Turkey as a model whenever political and economic turmoil breaks out in any Muslim country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism in the 1990s, it was commonly held that the 'Turkish model' based on secularism, pluralist-parliamentarian democracy and a free-market economy could make an essential contribution to the economic and political re-structuring processes of the Turkic republics in Central Asia. Turkey was expected to offer them close co-operation in the fields of trade, economic construction, cultural

affairs and education. The expectations on both sides were set very high. At the time, the slogan for Turkey was the "Star of the Orient" in *Der Spiegel*⁸ and political leaders in Ankara saw this as a unique opportunity to actively participate in and settle political issues from the Balkans to China. Former Prime Minister Demirel confidently announced in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* that with the collapse of the Soviet Union a "gigantic Turkish world" was emerging from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China⁹.

However it was not long before this euphoria was dampened by reality. The initial enthusiasm was followed by a return to business as usual. Mere rhetoric was not enough for Turkey to be regarded as one of the new regional powers of the new international order, words needed to be followed by deeds. In particular, the economic expectations of the partners were too high and the hoped-for 'privileged partnership' could not be established. It soon became clear that Turkey's financial and technological resources were too limited to meet the immense socio-economic needs of the underdeveloped former Soviet republics. At the same time, there was a reserved response to the so-called 'Turkish model' in the Turkic republics. Turkey had to turn back to 'real-politic' and began to develop its relations on a more pragmatic basis.

European and American think tanks and experts present us with a similar scenario with a new trade market called 'Neo-Ottomanism' which should follow the 'Arab Spring,' namely Turkey as a model for the Arab world. How relevant is the so-called Turkish experience to the Arab world?

The major difference between Turkey and other Islamic countries is the secular basis of its state, which it adopted from France in the 1930s. According to this model, by definition everybody has the right to their own beliefs with religion considered a part of private life. In addition religious affairs are not admitted in the public sphere and religious communities must operate under public law. However Turkey has had difficulties enforcing and instituting its secularist principles due to strong resistance to secularism within the Turkish population. There is still a gap between the rhetoric and reality of secularism in Turkey in that religion is not fully divorced from the state but under the control of the state¹⁰. The radical changes and rising political Islamic movement in the MENA states may accelerate the re-islamisation processes in Turkey rather than its being viewed as a model of government in these countries.

The most important characteristic of the MENA countries is their strong Islamic identity, which is inseparably linked to their cultural, social and economic life. Thus, it seems to be difficult to adopt and implement the separation of state and religious affairs in the coming decades. The election results in Morocco in 2011, Tunisia and Egypt confirm that political Islam is on the rise. For example, Nahda (Party of Renaissance) an Islamist party won Tunisia's general election. In Egypt, the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won with the majority, and the Party of Nour (Party of Light) showed a striking performance. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party won 107 seats in the 395-member parliament

in November 2011, indicating that it is very likely that Islam will dominate the Arab world politically in the coming years. Most Arab countries will probably continue to be governed by the military and authoritarian regimes where Islamic identity may continue to persist at least for a while under different names and dresses.

Another important characteristic of the MENA countries, with the exception of Libya and Algeria, is that they are poor economically. The 'Euro Med 2030' report published by the EU Commission lists a slow growth rate, high unemployment among young people, poverty and worsening income distribution. In order to reduce the unemployment rate by 2030, 55 million new jobs would have to be created.¹¹ All these economic factors contributed to the revolutionary movement in the MENA countries. Financial capital from Europe, the United States, China and the oil-exporting Arab states is urgently needed. Yet the fundamental and urgent question remains unanswered: who is going to finance these poor countries? The MENA countries over-estimate Turkey's capabilities since Turkey itself also suffers from high youth unemployment, current account deficit, poverty and a worsening income distribution. At the same time, a pessimistic view gaining ground among experts that Turkey's economic growth will fall from 8 or 9 percent to 2 percent due to the expected economic recession in Europe in the coming years. Furthermore, the economic conditions of Turkey's neighbours are worsening as a consequence of political instability. Besides all these facts, Turkey might be able to make con-

tributions to education and economic institutions building by exporting human capital to these economies, if it is demanded.

According to the progress reports published by the EU Commission and various global rankings, Turkey is seriously underperforming in a wide range of areas. It stands 67th in the Economic Freedom Index 2010, 58th in Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Index, 83rd in the latest UN Human Development Index, 138th in the Reporters Without Borders 2010 Press Freedom Index and 123rd in the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index.¹² Under these circumstances, it makes more sense for Turkey to deal first with its own internal priorities such as the implementation of universal values, before it can be accepted as a model by the Arab world. However, it is unclear if there is any strong demand, besides from some liberal-minded Arab intellectuals, by MENA countries to adopt and to implement the so-called Turkish model. It is also pertinent to ask if whether the Turkish model is perfectly replicable or suitable for the region's democratisation process. While it is clearly the case that these countries can learn some important lessons from Turkey's economic development and democratisation process, surely each country should decide and design its own modernisation model and strategy by learning from the experiences of various countries.

To conclude, the negotiation process with Brussels for Turkey's full membership into the EU continues to be sluggish and the relations have reached their lowest point since 1959. On the part of the EU no considerable interest has

been shown in the improvement for full membership and there are also no signs of when the negotiation process will be completed. Ankara has, in a fit of frustration turned its face to the Middle and Far East. Recently the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that "...Turkey can join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China) instead of its accession to the European Union". He described that group as "better and more powerful than the E.U." on top of which these states share "common values" with Turkey¹³. It is obvious that Turkey's leadership is frustrated and is losing its orientation to the West and moving East. Unfortunately, if the decision makers in Europe start believing that Ankara is bluffing in an attempt to force Brussels into serious negotiations, this could be costly for both partners¹⁴. If the relations between Ankara and Brussels should remain unchanged for the coming years, nobody would be surprised. Further, I would emphasize that we could come face to face with an entirely different Turkey in political and social norms if it were anchored in the Middle East.

On the one hand, Brussels would be well advised first of all to re-establish and intensify the usual relations during a negotiation process between a candidate country and the EU. On the other hand, the negotiation process for EU membership appears to be the best chance not only to reform Turkish institutions, but also to improve the political system by changing the political culture in Turkey. In this respect the Turkish government has to continue to enforce and promo-

te the 'Europeanization process', namely restructuring and modernizing policies in all realms. Whether Turkey becomes a full EU member or not, the implementation of EU legislation, norms, standards, and regulations are crucial with help of an external anchor, namely the European Union. Only if Turkey is able to complete its negotiations with the European Union successfully, will its political and economic role in the region be able to markedly change as a consequence.

Notes

- 1 Neil Ferguson (2011) "The Mideast's Next Dilemma," in *News Week* (Jun 19,).
- 2 Economist, "Ottoman dreamer" (Nov 5, 2011).
- 3 A comprehensive paper on this topic: See Bahri Yilmaz (2012), "Arab Spring and Revolutions in Turkey's Near Abroad," in Stephen Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld (eds) *Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean*, University of Malta, Malta: Gutenberg Press, pp.349-370.
- 4 Clough Cole (145), *Economic History of Europe* Boston, Heath, pp.151-152.
- 5 Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001) *Stratejik Derinlik* Istanbul: Kure Publications, pp. 151-152.
- 6 State Planning Organisation, "Main economic Indicators," Ankara.
- 7 Volker Perthes (2004) "America's Greater Middle East and Europe", SWP Comments in Daniela Schwarzer and Isabelle Werenfels, *The Union for the Mediterranean: A missed Opportunity*, SWP Comments (2008).
- 8 Der Spiegel (February 10, 1992) p.137.
- 9 Cumhuriyet (February 24, 1992).
- 10 Prime Minister Erdoğan gave his own interpretation of secularism in his recent visit to Egypt. He stated "...Do not be wary of secularism. I hope there will be a secular state in Egypt." He added that secularism does not mean a lack of religion, but the creation of respect for all religions and of religious freedom for individuals, saying "Secularism does not mean that people are secular. For example, I am not secular, but I am the prime minister of a secular state" Mark Champion, Matt Bradly, "Islamists Criticize Turkish Premier's Secular Remarks," in *The Wall Street Journal*, September 15, 2011. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576570670264116178.html>. The statement made by PM Erdoğan has

been heavily criticised by Muslim Brotherhood: see, same article "[...]It's not allowed for any non-Egyptian to interfere in our constitution", said Mahmoud Ghazlan, a spokesman for the Brotherhood, "if I was to advise the Turks I'd advise them to crop the secular article in their constitution, but I'm not allowed. It's not my right".

11 European Commission, Euro-Med 2030. Report of an Expert Group (Brussels: European Commission, 2011):11-25.

12 See Laura Schmidt and Jörg Dehnert, (2011) "Die neue Rolle der Türkei angesichts der jüngsten Entwicklungen in der Arabischen Welt," in *Friedrich Naumann Stiftung*, pp. 9-11

13 Andrew Finkel (2013), "Eastern Promises", in *Latitude, Views around the World*, 29 January.

14 According to Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 2013/1 published by EDAM, 2/3 of Turks are Euro-Pessimistic and 87 % of experts answered that Turkey's future lay with Europe. Less than 3 percent thought it should look elsewhere.